What the news has gotten wrong about the Potomac mid-air crash

We don't know everything yet, but what's true and what's false are coming into clearer focus.

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On January 29, an American Airlines CRJ700 and a US Army Black Hawk helicopter collided at 8:47pm over the Potomac River in Washington, DC near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. The wreckage of both aircraft fell into the river and 67 people aboard both aircraft were killed.

The CRJ was descending on its final approach to Washington, a flight path which crosses the Potomac diagonally. The Black Hawk was following along the river, coming in the opposite direction. The aircraft collided about 45º off from head-on. They were both easily within each other’s field of vision.

The cause of the crash, though not yet determined, is almost certainly going to be pilot error. The two planes should have seen each other. Neither did until it was too late.

Among many possible things that could have led to a pilot error (by either or both pilots), the news has focused a lot on these four particular things:

1. The pilot of the helicopter may have been above the allowed ceiling of 200 feet. However, at this early stage, we have contradictory information about exactly how high it was, but one reading says 278 feet.

2. The helicopter was not broadcasting from its ADS-B, which may have been turned off. This has been reported as a “critical safety system.”

3. The helicopter pilot, having been advised by the tower of the other aircraft, may have had the wrong aircraft in sight — a flight that had just departed Washington.

4. The tower at Washington was understaffed, and one controller was doing the job of two people.

I wanted a better perspective. So I got in touch with a friend who asked me not to use his name, but he is an Air Traffic Controller and used to work in the tower at Davison Army Airfield, 12 miles southwest of Washington, which is where these Black Hawks on this route fly in and out of. So he is intimately familiar with this airspace and the procedures. I’ll call my friend Biff, because why not.

We do know that the Black Hawk pilot, Capt. Rebecca Lobach, was doing her annual night vision qualification. They can see to fly just fine wearing the night vision goggles (NVGs), with the exception that their field of vision is reduced to about 40º. There is typically no need for NVGs on these helicopters’ normal PAT duty (Priority Air Transport, basically shuttling VIPs around DC), but Biff explained to me another emergency duty that these Black Hawks also are trained to perform that very much does require the NVGs. So it was not unusual or problematic for her to be wearing them on this flight.

As the pilot, Lobach sat in the right front seat (typical for right-handed helicopter pilots); in the left seat was the chief warrant officer who was evaluating her qualification; sitting behind them was a crew chief. Normally they fly with two crew chiefs, but for whatever reason, there was only one on this flight.

And so now, with Biff’s expertise at hand, let’s look at those four things:

The Black Hawk’s altitude.

Although we still don’t have definitive altitude information for the Black Hawk, it does appear probable that Lobach was above her ceiling of 200 feet — a rule imposed by Washington Airport. At the moment of impact, the Black Hawk’s radio altitude (basically a radar pointed straight down) was 287; the CRJ’s was 313. So it probably occurred right around 300 feet — although we still don’t have enough information to confirm this.

When I asked Biff about this, he said whether the Black Hawk was above its maximum altitude ceiling really wasn’t all that important! This surprised me. He gave two basic reasons for this:

1. If two aircraft missed each other by only 100 feet in that airspace, that alone is a major near-miss event. Heads would roll from just that. Two planes should never be so close that the 200-feet ceiling would have come into play.

2. Jets making the same approach as that CRJ can be at any altitude they want. Sometimes they would be under 200 feet at that very same place. So, see #1. Both pilots should have avoided the situation for many reasons other than the 200-foot ceiling.

Lobach’s likely exceeding of her ceiling makes her an easy target for blame, but both pilots failed to take the actions needed for such a close call.

The Black Hawk’s ADS-B was disabled.

This doesn’t really matter at all. ADS-B transmits your position (and other stuff) so you can appear on other planes’ screens and so ATC can identify you. BUT — and that’s an important but — ADS-B is big-picture stuff and doesn’t look out for collisions; it is not the instrument you’d use to detect nearby traffic. ADS-B Out transmits your position; ADS-B In receives the positions of other aircraft, and if so equipped, your screen may have a way to display them in a larger, theater-wide kind of way.

TCAS is the important instrument here (Traffic Collision Avoidance System). This is an instrument dedicated to looking for potential collisions, and it will sound an alarm from holy hell if one is detected. The CRJ had TCAS, and it would have been screaming a verbal alert “Traffic!! Traffic!!” except for one detail: TCAS alerts are muted below 1,000 feet. This is because a pilot who’s landing has too many other important things to worry about and can’t tolerate distractions, and because there are a thousand other systems in place to prevent any “traffic” from being in your way on final approach. The CRJ’s TCAS did display a silent visual alert called a “traffic advisory” but if either pilot noticed it, it was too late.

Black Hawk helicopters do not have TCAS. The thinking is that since they often fly in military formations and stuff, it would be alerting all the time. Maybe someone should rethink that, and put one in. If Lobach had had TCAS, this collision would not have happened.

Lobach had the wrong aircraft in sight.

This is coming to be regarded as a given — but the aircraft mentioned most in the press could not have been the one she had her eye on. The tower advised Lobach of the CRJ, and she replied she had it in sight. What’s been reported is that a plane that had just departed Washington is what Lobach was actually looking at, and so she never actually saw the CRJ.

From Lobach’s POV, the CRJ was coming in from her 10:30 position. But she had the NVGs on, and probably missed it due to the reduced field of vision. The tower advised her of the CRJ traffic, and dead ahead of her were the landing lights of another plane, American Airlines 3130, an Airbus 319. The CRJ and the 319 were coming in to land at two different runways that were at a 40º angle from one another. So while the CRJ was coming in from an angle, the 319 was coming in straight toward Lobach. It was easy for her to see its oncoming landing lights and avoid it. And she acknowledged over the radio that she had the traffic in sight, meaning there was no problem.

What’s been reported is that she had a departing plane in sight. This was probably an Air Canada flight, JZA798. This would have been in her 5:00 position, back behind her, and going the other way. Nope, there’s no way she would have seen this and thought it was the plane coming toward her. Terrible work, whoever suggested that.

Some have noted that if the Black Hawk had had its full complement of two crew chiefs on board, the one sitting on the left side of the chopper may have seen the CRJ and voiced an alarm. Very possible. And since Lobach was in the right seat, it would have been her co-pilot who was most likely to see the incoming CRJ in heir 10:30 position. But there was no co-pilot; that seat was occupied by the chief warrant officer.

From the perspective of the CRJ, Lobach was in about their 1:00 position. They had the TCAS traffic advisory. They knew from the tower that the Black Hawk was there. Why didn’t they see it? This remains just as unknown as why the Black Hawk didn’t see them.

The tower was understaffed.

If they were, it probably did not result in anything that contributed to this crash. Once the tower advised Lobach of the CRJ traffic, and Lobach replied that she had it in sight, Biff explained that the tower’s responsibility is over at that point. Once the pilots acknowledge what you told them, and respond that they’re aware of it, your job is to move on to other things.

So, my thanks to Biff for going through all of these items with me. If you want to see more, including getting a visual perspective on all this, I recommend checking out Mick West’s video here, and another video from VASAviation here that Biff recommended.

A reminder that the investigation is not completed and some of this is quite possibly wrong, but it’s about the best we have at this point.

To all service members who perished, thank you for your service; and to all other victims, may you find clear skies ahead.